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Issues about the causal role of the mental – about whether mental states (beliefs, desires, intentions and so on) can cause or figure in causal explanations of other mental states or behavior, about what it even means to attribute causal efficacy to a mental state, and about how claims about mental causation/explanation  fit with (or fail to fit with or are undermined by) claims about causation by neural mechanisms – have been matters of intense debate within the philosophical literature over the past decade. Some philosophers argue that generally accepted claims about what makes a relationship causal and about the relationship between mind and body yield the conclusion that mental states cannot cause anything -- that the mental is entirely causally inert or epiphenomenal.  The arguments for this conclusion are largely metaphysical and quasi- apriori in the sense that the conclusion is supposed to follow from the combination of very general and presumably uncontroversial empirical assumptions about the relationships between the mental and the physical (the causal closure of physics and the absence of systematic causal over-determination of mental states by both mental and physical causes) together with assumptions about what   is involved in mental causation. Other philosophers have found this conclusion literally incredible and have sought to identify flaws in the arguments that seem to support it.  However, no particular  counterargument  has won  general acceptance.  
 In this paper, I propose to examine these issues within the framework of the account of causation and causal explanation worked out in my recent book, Making Things Happen (MTH). One of my themes will be that many of the standard arguments for the causal inertness of the mental rest on   mistaken assumptions about what it is for a relationship to be causal, and about what is involved in providing a causal explanation. These mistaken assumptions involve an inter-related complex of ideas, described below: a conception of causation according to which a cause is simply a condition (or a conjunct in a condition) which is  nomologically sufficient for its effect, and the closely associated   deductive-nomological (DN) conception of explanation according to which explaining an outcome is simply a matter of exhibiting a nomologically sufficient condition for it. Given these assumptions, it is indeed hard to understand how there can be such a thing as mental causation. However, the account of causation defended in MTH undercuts these assumptions and in doing so, allows us to reach a better understanding of what is involved in mental causation and of the real empirical issues surrounding this notion.




  MTH defends a manipulationist or interventionist account of causation: causal  (as opposed to merely correlational) relationships are relationships that are potentially exploitable for purposes of manipulation and control. As an illustration of what this means, consider the well known correlation between attendance at a private (that is, non government run) secondary school in the contemporary U. S. and scholastic achievement: students who attend private   schools tend to score higher on various measures of scholastic achievement than students who attend public schools. This correlation raises the question of whether private school attendance causes superior scholastic achievement or whether instead the relationship between these two variables is merely correlational, with the correlation between them due to the causal influence of some other variable(s). To take only the most obvious possibilities, it may be that parents with higher SES are more likely to send their children to private schools and that SES (socio-economic status)  also directly causes scholastic achievement. Or it may be that parents who send their children to private schools tend to value educational achievement more and these values directly influence their children’s performance. If we let P be a variable measuring whether  a child attends public or private school, S a variable measuring scholastic achievement, and  E  and A be variables measuring, respectively, parents’ social economic status and attitudes toward education, these possibilities might be represented as follows, with an arrow from X to Y meaning that X causes Y: 

             
On a manipulationist conception of cause, the question of whether P causes S is identified with the question of whether S would change under some suitable manipulation of P. If P causes S, then other things being equal, this will be a good or effective strategy. If on the other hand, if P and S are merely correlated as in Figure 1, changing the school the child attends should have no effect on achievement. Instead changing SES or parental attitudes would an effective strategy for affecting achievement.
How might one determine whether S would change under a suitable manipulation of P and what does “suitable” mean in this context? One possibility would be to perform a randomized experiment: children in the population of interest are randomly assigned to one of two groups, one of which is sent to private schools and the other to public schools. One then looks to see whether there is a correlation between P and S. The effect of the randomization (it is assumed) is to remove any systematic  difference between the two groups with respect to parental SES,  attitudes, or indeed any other factors that might influence S independently of P. Any remaining correlation between P and S should thus be attributable to the causal influence of P on S. If Figure 1 represents the correct causal structure there should be no correlation between P and S under any such intervention on P. 


















In this case there will be a change in S under an intervention on P, reflecting the fact that  (unlike the situation  represented in Figure 1)   P makes a causal contribution to S that is  independent of, or in addition to, the contribution made by E.  
Note  that if we want to do an experiment of this sort to determine whether P causes S it is crucial to the logic of the experiment that the intervention not itself cause or be correlated with other causes of S that are independent of P. For example, if Figure 1a is the correct structure, an alternative way of manipulating P (besides what is represented by Figure 2) would be to manipulate E (perhaps we give parents a very large cash grant). This manipulation of E would change the value of P in the population (since E causes P), but it would (obviously) not be a good experimental design for determining whether P causes S since it confounds any effect of P on S with the effect of changing E on S. Instead, what we want is that, among other desiderata, the experimental manipulation be such that the variation in P it introduces is uncorrelated with or independent of other possible causes of its putative effect S (except of course for those other possible causes that lie on any causal route (should one exist) from P  to S. An experimental manipulation of P that has this feature and also features that rule out other confounding possibilities  is what we mean by an intervention.
 Giving a precise characterization of the notion of an intervention   turns out to be non-trivial and the reader is referred to  the accompanying footnote and also to MTH, Chapter 3 for details. For the  purposes of this essay, it will be enough to stick with the intuitive conception just illustrated: think of an intervention on one variable X with respect to a second variable Y as an idealized experimental manipulation of X which is well designed for the purpose of determining whether X causes Y, in the sense that it excludes various confounding possibilities such as those illustrated above. As we shall see, in contexts (including  discussions of mental causation) in which values of  some variables supervene on others, the issue of what counts as such a  confounding possibility  requires some careful thought—this is addressed below, especially in Section 6. 
Given this notion, we may use it to give an interventionist characterization   of what it is for a  variable X to cause or be  causally relevant to a second variable  Y.  (I will use  “cause” and “causally relevant”  interchangeably and in a generic sense according to which X causes Y if it is either positively or negatively relevant or of mixed relevance for Y). 
(M) X causes Y if and only if  there are background circumstances B such that  if some (single) intervention  that changes the value of X (and no other variable) were to occur in B,  then Y  would change​[1]​.  
(M) obviously requires some explication. First, note that it relates variables, which as Woodward, 2003 explains, are the natural candidates for  the relata of causal claims within an interventionist framework. A variable is simply a property, quantity etc, which is capable of taking two or more “values”. Philosophers often focus on causal claims relating types of events, and we can think of these relata as two-valued, with the values in question  corresponding to the presence or absence of this  type of event.  For example, we may think of the claim that short circuits cause fires as relating variables which take values corresponding to <short circuit present, short circuit absent>, and <fire present, fire absent>.  However, some variables such as pressure or mass may take   many different values.  
The reference to background conditions is added to accommodate the familiar fact that it may be that it is only under certain conditions, not specified in the description of X itself, under which interventions on X are associated with changes in Y. Thus, for example, according to M, short circuits  cause fires as long as it is true that in some background circumstances (having to do with the presence of oxygen etc.) interventions that change whether a short circuit occurs are associated with changes in whether a fire occurs (or in the probability of fire). 
Next, note that the formulation  M   relates  changes in X (due to an intervention) to changes in Y (or in the probability distribution of Y).  Focusing first on the case in which the causal claim relates changes in the value of X to the changes in the value of Y,   I take this to imply that there is a pattern of association between X and Y such that each of these variables can take at least two different values (X=x, x’ with x x’, Y= y, y’ with y  y’ ) such that  one (e.g., x)  of these values   of X (when produced  by an intervention) is associated with one (y)  of the values of Y and a different value x’ of X  (when produced by an intervention) is associated  with a different value y’ of Y.   That is, X causes Y if and only if  there are distinct values of X and Y meeting the conditions just described  and background circumstances B in which  two counterfactuals of the following form are true:
(M*) 
(M1*) If an intervention that sets X=x were to  occur in B, then Y=y.
 (M2*) If an intervention that sets X=x’ were to occur in B, then Y=y’.
When M1* and M2*  hold, I will say that a change in the value of X from X=x to X=x’ (where x x’) in background circumstances B causes  a change in the value of Y from Y= y to Y=y’(and vice-versa).  
  For reasons of space I cannot provide a complete explication or defense of (M) (or the closely related M*) here.  Instead I draw attention to just a few features that will be important to our subsequent discussion. First,  M is intended as a characterization of what is sometimes called type as opposed to token or actual causation. That is, M is intended as an explication of the notion of cause that figures in claims like “attendance at private school causes improved scholastic achievement”  (alternatively: “a change in attendance from public to private school causes a change in scholastic achievement from better to worse”)  “smoking causes lung cancer” as opposed to such token claims as  “Smith’s attendance at private school in 1990 caused his scholastic achievement in the same year to improve” or “Jones’ smoking caused his lung cancer” . As MTH  shows, the interventionist account can also be used to capture a notion of token causation, but with the exception of some remarks about pre-emption and redundancy in section 6, my focus in this essay will be entirely on type causal notions of the sort captured by M and on type  causal claims about mental causation.  The reason for this focus is that I take issues about the causal role of the mental to be in the first instance issues about type casual claims involving mental states – whether beliefs, desires intentions cause other mental states or behavior.  If such claims about mental causation are never true, then presumably it is also never true that,  e.g.,  some particular token mental state of Jones caused some bit of his behavior.  The latter token claims also, however, raise some distinctive issues of their own that for the purposes of this essay are simply distractions.
Second, although (M) takes causal claims to have implications for the results of interventions and vice –versa, M  does  not claim (and it is obviously false that) the only way to tell whether X causes Y is to experimentally intervene on X and see what happens to Y. Plainly one can sometimes learn about casual relationships by means of inference from passive, non-experimental observations  -- for example, by the use of various causal modeling techniques.  What (M) implies is that  to the extent that the output of such techniques provide accurate descriptions of causal relationships, they should correctly describe  how  effect variables would respond to  hypothetical experiments in which  interventions occur  on cause variables.    
  As the previous paragraph makes explicit, (M) embodies a counterfactual account of causation in the sense that it links the claim that X causes Y  to  a claim  about what would happen to Y if, perhaps contrary to actual fact, an intervention on X were to occur – what I will  call an  interventionist counterfactual.   As MTH explains in more detail, the conditions that characterize the notion of an intervention do roughly the same work as the similarity  metric   in Lewis’ version of a counterfactual theory of causation: given an appropriately characterized notion of an intervention,  the counterfactuals that figure in M will be non-backtracking,  the  joint effects of a common cause will not be counterfactually dependent on one another when dependence is understood in terms of interventionist counterfactuals, and other standard counter-examples to counterfactual accounts of causation will be blocked.
I assume that interventionist counterfactuals and the causal claims associated with them can be true even if the interventions that figure in their antecedents cannot in fact be carried out by human beings because of practical or other sorts of limitations.  However, I also assume that if a candidate causal claim is   associated with interventions  that are impossible for  (or lack any clear sense  because of)  logical, conceptual or perhaps metaphysical reasons, then that causal claim is itself illegitimate or ill-defined. In other words, I take it to be an implication of M that a legitimate causal claim should have an intelligible  interpretation in terms of counterfactuals the antecedents of which are coherent or make sense.      
As an illustration, the claim that an asteroid impact caused the extinction of the dinosaurs can be understood within an interventionist framework as a claim about what would have happened to the dinosaurs if an intervention had occurred to prevent such an asteroid impact during the relevant time period.  In this case we have both (i) a reasonably clear conception of what such an intervention would involve and (ii) principled ways of  determining what would happen if such an intervention were to occur.  By contrast,  neither (i) nor (ii) hold  if we are asked  to consider hypothetical interventions that make it the case that 2+2   4 or that the same object is at the same time both pure gold and pure aluminum or that transform human beings into houseflies.  Causal claims that require for their explication claims about what would happen under such interventions (“2+2 = 4 causes it to be the case that…”) are  thus unclear or at least have no legitimate role in empirical inquiry. This idea – that the counterfactuals that are relevant to the explication of causal claims must  have a clear interventionist interpretation—will play an important role below. 
A closely related idea, to which I will also appeal, is that genuinely competing or rival causal claims must make different predictions about what would happen under some possible intervention or interventions, where the interventions in question are again such that we have some coherent conception of what it would be like for them to occur. Thus if we have two apparently competing claims, the first contending some mental state is causally inert and   the other contending that it causes some outcome, it must be possible to specify some set of (coherent, well-defined) interventions such that the two claims make competing predictions about what would happen under those interventions.  If we cannot associate such an interventionist interpretation with one or both of the claims, the claim(s) in question lack a clear sense and if they fail to make different predictions about what would happen under such interventions, they are not genuine competitors.
  Note that M characterizes a rather weak and non-specific notion of “cause” : for  X to cause Y all that is required is that there be some change in X such that  when this is produced by an intervention in some background circumstances, it is associated with a change in Y or in its probability distribution. One reason for formulating M in this way (rather than, say, in terms of  the claim that all changes in X must be associated with changes in Y)  is that many causal claims (including claims involving mental or psychological causation) exhibit threshold effects: X may cause Y even though some changes in the value of X are not associated with any changes in Y, as long as some other changes in X are associated with such changes – see   example (1.1) below.  Ideally, of course, we would like to know much more than this: we’d like to know exactly which changes in X are associated with exactly which  changes in Y and in what background circumstances. Within  the interventionist account such information is spelled out in terms of more fine-grained interventionist counterfactuals specifying in a detailed way how Y changes under various interventions that change the value of X.   
Next,  let me make explicit a consequence of the fact that  (M) relates changes in the value of X to changes in the value of Y: as the formulation in terms of M* underscores, (M)   implies that for X to count as a cause of Y, there must be at least two different values of X, x and x’, and at least two different values of Y,  y and y’ such that under an intervention that changes  the value of X from x to x’, the value of Y changes from y to y’.  This captures the intuition that whatever else a cause is, it must  make a difference to its effect: to say that a cause makes a difference to its effect implies that there must be  at least two possible states, corresponding to the cause being present or the cause being absent or to the cause being in one state rather than another state such that which of these is realized is associated with  some change or difference in the state of the effect (the difference between the effect being present or absent etc.)​[2]​ Causal claims  thus have built into them the feature that philosophers call contrastive focus or “rather than” structure:  when we make the structure of a causal claim explicit,   we see that   the real content of the claim is something like this: it is the contrast between X’s taking  some value x and its taking some different value x’ that causes the contrast between Y’s taking value y and value y’ (or alternatively it  is the fact that X=x rather than X=x’ which causes Y to be y rather  than y’ or the change from X= x to X=x’ that causes the change from Y= y to Y=y’) The causal claim that it is the contrast between X=x rather than X= x’ that causes the contrast between Y= y  rather than Y=y’ is thus a different causal claim, with a different content,  from a causal claim involving a different contrast in the values of X such as the claim that X=x rather than X= x’’ (where x’’  x’) accounts for the contrast between Y= y rather than Y=y’’.   
We noted above that there are many cases in which some changes in the value of a candidate cause variable X  will  be associated with changes in the value of a candidate effect variable Y , but other changes in which X will not be associated with changes in Y.  Making the contrastive focus of a causal claim explicit is a natural way of representing such facts. When the contrastive focus of a causal claim is not made explicit, there  may or may not be a natural default specification of  the  contrast situation  which corresponds to the cause being different or absent.   As an illustration of the first possibility, if the claim of interest is that short circuits cause fires, the  natural default contrast (if this is not explicitly specified) is a situation in which  no  short circuits of any kind and no alternative causes of fire are present—this (rather than a situation in which, e.g., no short circuit occurs but some  other source of fire is present) is taken to be the situation that corresponds to the  “absence” of short circuits. That is, the claim is naturally interpreted as the claim that the contrast between the presence of a short circuit and a contrasting situation in which no short circuits or other causes of fire  are present (or a change from one of these situations to another)  causes the contrast between (or a change from) an outcome in which some fire is present and a contrasting situation in which no fires occur.   On the other hand, in many cases in which the cause variable is quantitative or capable of taking a number of values (rather than just two—present and absent)  and no contrastive state is explicitly specified, there may be many different possible candidates for this   state and different outcomes associated with each.   In such cases, the causal claim may be ambiguous unless we make clear what contrastive focus is intended. 
Whether or not there is a natural default,   a causal claim will  be defective  to the extent that it suggests that some contrast or difference in the value of the cause variable is associated with changes in the effect variable when this is not the case or if it fails to make explicit  which changes in the cause variable are associated with which changes in the effect variable,( as would be the case, for example, if there is no obvious default and the contrastive focus is not specified).  In some cases of this sort, it may seem most natural to think of this defect as a matter of  the causal claim being false and in other cases, more natural to think of the claim as true but misleading or as failing to covey  information that it should convey.   For our purposes, it often will not matter much  which of these alternative assessments is adopted.
As an illustration, consider a platform that will collapse if and only if a weight greater than 1000 kg is placed on it.  If it is claimed that (1. 1) it is the fact that the weight on the platform was greater than 1000kg that causes the platform to collapse,  this is naturally interpreted as the claim that it is the contrast between the weight being greater than rather than  less than 1000kg  that caused the platform to collapse –   a claim that is correct in the specified circumstances. That is, the weight’s being less than 1000kg is the natural default  for the absence of the cause when no explicit contrast is specified. 
 Suppose that in these same circumstances, it was instead claimed that (1.2) the weight’s being 1600 kg causes the collapse. According to (M), this claim is also true since there is some intervention (namely one that changes the weight to below 1000 kg)   that would be associated with a change in the effect. Nonetheless there is an obvious sense in which (1.2) is   potentially misleading  since  it  is naturally interpreted as suggesting that  it is the contrast between the weight being 1600 kg rather than some   different (presumably lesser) weight that accounts for the collapse   and this is not true for many weights that are different from 1600 kg. At the very least (1.2) is deficient, in comparison with (1.2), in failing to communicate information about the conditions under which the platform would not have collapsed.  Put in terms of M*,  (1.2) does not tell us which changes in the weight cause changes in whether the platform collapses (or not) . This observation will turn out to be important in connection with claims about mental causation.
 Finally, note  that according to (M),  if no changes (produced by interventions) in the value of X  are associated with changes in the value of Y , then X does not cause Y.   Instead, X is causally irrelevant or causally inert with respect to Y.  Put slightly differently, if we understand causal (ir)relevance in the manner just suggested ( X is causally relevant to Y if and only if there is at least one change in the value of X such that if it were produced by an intervention, there would be a change in the value of Y), there is no such thing as a cause of Y that is not causally relevant to Y.  Equally, if X is causally relevant to Y, then X causes Y. Bona fide causal claims always have relevance claims   built into them. I stress this point because some influential writers on mental causation seem to  assume (more or less explicitly) that there is a notion of causation or causal efficacy according to which X can cause Y without being causally relevant (in the sense just defined) to Y or, alternatively, that X can be causally relevant to Y, without its being true that X causes Y.    
So far I have been talking about causation. What does  causal explanation involve on an  interventionist conception? Some philosophers distinguish very sharply between providing a casual explanation of an outcome (hereafter the explanandum outcome) and making true claims about the causes of that outcome. I agree that these are different activities,  but see them as very closely related. On my view, providing  a causal explanation of an outcome requires making true claims about its causes. Of course, typically, there will there will be many different true causal  claims one may make about an outcome of interest. Some of these true causal claims will be superior to others  from the point of view of explanation   – superior because they are, e.g. more general or provide more information about the conditions under which alternatives to the explanandum outcome occur.  (See below for illustrations) But  these  more general etc. causal claims are still just ordinary causal claims that must (if interventionism is correct) possess the sorts of features set out in M – they are not some special sort of causal claim with special features that play a role in causal explanation but not in other kinds of causal ascription. In my view, there is thus a connection between features of our explanatory practice involving mental events and the truth of causal claims about the mental in the following sense:  if  various  features of our practice of giving causal explanations involving mental events are correct or well-founded, then the causal claims figuring in those explanations must be true.  
With this as background, let me flesh out the  interventionist conception of causal explanation a bit: we may think of this as embodying a  what- if –things- had- been -different  conception of explanation:  we explain an outcome by identifying  conditions under which the explanandum-outcome would have been different, that is, information about  changes that  might be used to manipulate or control the outcome. More generally, successful causal explanation consists in the exhibition of patterns of dependency (as expressed by interventionist counterfactuals) between the factors cited in the explanans and the explanandum – factors that are such that changes in them produced by interventions are systematically associated with changes in the explanandum outcome.  Other things being equal, causal explanations will be better to the extent that the cited patterns of dependency are detailed,  complete, and accurate in the sense of  identifying all and only   those factors such that changes in them  (when produced by interventions) are associated with changes in the explanandum phenomenon.   In other words, good explanations should both include information about all factors which are such that changes in them are  associated with some change in the explanandum- phenomenon of interest and not include factors such that no changes in them are associated with changes in the explanandum – phenomenon (such factors are causally or explanatorily irrelevant to the explandandum phenomenon).  
How does this conception of causal explanation compare with the well-known deductive –nomological (DN) model of explanation, according to which we explain an explanandum by deriving it from a “law” and other true statements (typically about “initial conditions) and in this sense exhibiting a nomologically sufficient condition for it?  One  crucial  difference​[3]​,   which is  of central importance in the mental causation/explanation debate, is  that the  DN model does not impose the requirement that a successful explanation answer a what- if things –had- been- different question. This is the source of a number of well-known counterexamples to the DN model. Consider the following derivations, due to Wesley Salmon (1984):   

All men who take birth control pills fail to get pregnant.
Jones is a man who takes birth control pills 
Jones fails to get pregnant

All samples of hexed salt dissolve in water 
This is a sample of hexed salt
This dissolves in water.

In both cases, the derivations are sound and the generalizations in them satisfy the criteria for lawfulness found in the philosophical literature. Nonetheless, the derivations don’t seem explanatory. In both cases, the underlying defect seems the same:  the derivations cite conditions that, although nomologically sufficient for their explananda, are not causally  relevant (in the sense captured by (M)) to those explananda. That is, we judge that the above explanations are defective because they  cite conditions that  are not  causes of  (or causally relevant to) the outcomes they purport to explain. For example, changes  in whether Jones takes birth control pills (when produced by interventions)  are not associated with changes in whether he gets pregnant,  and, in accordance with (M) , this is reflected in our judgment that taking birth control pills does not cause and is not causally relevant to Jones’ failure to get pregnant.  Similarly,  changes in whether the salt is hexed  or not (when produced by interventions) are  not associated with changes in whether it dissolves and this is what accounts for our judgment that the hexing does not cause and is not causally relevant to the dissolving. The causal irrelevance of Jones’ taking birth control pills and the hexing  of the salt to these outcomes is also reflected in the fact that explanations that appeal to these factors do not provide answers   to what- if-things-had-been-different questions about these outcomes.   As these examples illustrate, citing a nomologically sufficient condition for some outcome is not the same thing as answering a what-if things-had-been-different question  with respect to that outcome.   Similarly, contrary to what a number of philosophers of mind seem to suppose, a condition that is linked by law to an outcome is not necessarily a condition which causes or  is causally relevant (in the sense of cause and causal relevance captured by (M)) to that outcome. 
A parallel observation applies to accounts of causation which take C to be a cause of E if and only if C is a nomologically sufficient condition for E (or what we might loosely call a “part” or “conjunct”  in such a condition). The hexing of the salt is nomologically sufficient for its dissolution when placed in water but does not cause this dissolution  and Jones’ taking birth control pills is nomologically sufficient for  but does not cause his failure to get pregnant.  In both cases, (M) elucidates the basis for these judgments:  the conditions cited as causes are not such that any interventions on them are associated with changes in their putative effects.
Let me conclude this section with some brief remarks about an issue that will be a source of concern to a number of readers. The account sketched above links causal claims and explanations to the truth of certain interventionist counterfactuals. A common contention is that counterfactuals cannot be “barely true” – instead they require “truth makers” that presumably must be specified in non- counterfactual terms. “Laws” are the usual candidates for such truth-makers. For a variety of reasons I am skeptical about this contention, but, as nearly as I can see, nothing will turn in what follows on what we take the truth makers for counterfactuals to be.  What matters for the arguments that follow is whether causal claims and explanations are related to  interventionist counterfactuals in the way that I have claimed—any account of the truth conditions for counterfactuals that is consistent with these relationships will be acceptable for the purposes of this essay. 
That having been said, there is a certain tempting but plainly mistaken inference that we need to be careful to avoid. The inference goes something like this: counterfactuals require laws as truth makers; therefore, any account of causation in terms of counterfactuals is committed to an account according to which all that is involved in one item, property etc. A  causing or being causally relevant to another B is that A be linked by law to B. In other words, the inference is from  the claim that the laws are the truth makers for counterfactuals (and causal claims) to  the conclusion that a nomological sufficiency account of causation and causal relevance is adequate.




What are the implications  of the framework described in Section 1  for  the status of “mental causation”? Prima-facie, it seems to support the claim that mental states can be causes.  We do after all seem to regularly (and successfully) intervene to change  the mental states of others and perhaps our own mental states as well and these  changes in turn sometimes seem to be regularly associated with changes in other mental states and in behavior. Indeed, this seems to be what successful persuasion and deception are all about -- in persuasion   I manipulate your beliefs and desires by providing you with   information  or material inducements, typically with the goal in mind that these changes will in turn lead to further changes  that I desire in your mental state or behavior.  On an interventionist   conception of cause,  this is all that is required for mental causation – nothing more metaphysically portentous is needed. That is,  
all that is required for changes in a mental state M1 to cause  changes in a second mental state M2 (or in behavior B) is that it be true that under some intervention  that changes M1, M2  (or B) will change.   Common sense  certainly  supposes that episodes like these  are very widespread.  
Moreover, mental causation in the interventionist sense doesn’t seem confined to such contexts.   Many experiments in psychology and the social sciences are naturally regarded as involving, among other things, successful attempts by the experimenters to manipulate subject’s beliefs by giving them verbal instructions  (about e.g., what the experimental task is, what they will be rewarded for doing etc),  where  the goal of the experiment is to discover how these changes are systematically associated with  changes in subjects’  behavior. Similarly, it is very natural to interpret many experiments (in, e.g. social psychology and experimental economics)  involving  interactions between people  as investigations of, among other things, how changes in subject’s beliefs about one another’s beliefs and desires cause changes in behavior. For example, changes in my beliefs about how likely you are to cooperate in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma or trust game will cause changes in my behavior toward you, changes in responder’s beliefs about the alternatives available to the proposer in an ultimatum game will cause changes in the  probability of responder rejecting the proposer’s offer and so on. Even experimental demonstrations  that show that certain beliefs do not, contrary to what subjects and others expect, causally influence subject’s behavior (as with experiments that show a position effect in the choice among identical consumer items and that subsequent reason giving is confabulation) seem to require some conception of what would be evidence for a causal influence   of belief on behavior   – it is the failure to find such evidence that shows the belief to have no causal influence. There would be no point in performing the experiment if beliefs could never, as a matter of principle,  causally influence behavior.  

				3. 
Although the notion of mental causation  thus seems, at least on the surface,  unproblematic from a interventionist  perspective, the philosophical literature is full of arguments to the contrary—  arguments that purport to show that mental states or properties cannot (ever) cause other mental states or behavior.   In what follows I want to explore some of these arguments. I  will begin  at a relatively general and  intuitive level and then consider some more precise arguments
One motivation for skepticism about assigning any causal role to the mental derives from the assumption that mental states are “multiply realizable”​[4]​ by different neural or physical states, combined with the thought that there is a general preference for detailed or fine grained or more micro level causal claims/ explanations (in this case claims at some physical or neural level) over less fine grained, more macro (e.g mental or psychological) claims. Suppose that my intention I  to reach for a grape on some particular occasion is followed by  my reaching  for that grape (Call this behavior R)  Assume (as is standard) that  I has neural/physical “realization” N1    (on this particular occasion), but that this same type of intention I might also have had a number of other possible  realizations N2 ,N3, … etc. where the   description of  each of these   realizations   contains a great deal more fine grained detailed information than the description that just adverts to I. If, furthermore,  N1  is by itself (nomologically) sufficient for the occurrence of R, given the rest of the condition of my brain, why isn’t it at least preferable and perhaps mandatory to   think of N1 as causing or causally explaining R?    And once we do this, what causal or explanatory role can I play? 
	To explore the cogency of this reasoning, let us consider some other examples involving a choice between more or less fine-grained causal information.
3.1) Suppose that a mole of   ideal gas   at temperature T1  and pressure P1 at time t1 is confined to a container of fixed volume V. The temperature of the gas is then increased to T2 by the application of a heat source and the gas is allowed to reach a new equilibrium at time t2 where its pressure is found to have increased to P2.  One strategy (the macroscopic strategy) for  explaining (or  exhibiting the causes of) the new pressure is to appeal to the ideal gas law PV=nRT which describes the relationship between  the macroscopic variables  pressure, temperature and volume.  According to this law,  when the temperature is increased to T2 and the volume remains fixed, the new pressure at equilibrium must increase to P2= nRT2/V. 
Now contrast this with the following, (entirely impractical) microscopic strategy for explaining the behavior of the gas: one notes the exact position and momentum of each of the 6x1023 molecules making up the gas. Call this configuration G1. From G1, the details of how the temperature source contributes to the  kinetic energy of each of the individual  molecules  and knowledge of the exact laws governing the interactions between each of these molecules, one traces the trajectory of each gas molecule through time,  eventually ending up with the exact position and momentum of each molecule making up  the gas at time t2.  This molecular configuration, G2, communicates a net force per unit area to the surface of the container which is just the  new pressure P2.
	This  microscopic strategy is obviously impossible to carry out: among other difficulties, we cannot determine the positions and momentum of the individual molecules with the required exactness and the 6x1023 body problem of their interaction is  of course computationally intractable  But the inadequacies of this strategy do not just have to do with our epistemic limitations. There is a more fundamental difficulty: while the strategy succeeds in tracing the particular trajectories of individual molecules that in fact led on this particular occasion  to the macroscopic outcome P2, it  omits   important causally relevant information: that there are a very large number of other molecular trajectories, compatible with the macroscopic conditions satisfied by the gas   (its temperature, volume, and pressure at t1 and its new temperature at t2) that   would lead to the same macroscopic outcome – that is, the new pressure P2.  In fact, one may show that for all except a very small set of initial conditions (a set of measure zero)  for the molecules of the gas that satisfy these    macroscopic conditions, the trajectories of the individual molecules will be such that the gas   will exert pressure P2 at t2. There is thus an important respect in which the micro-explanation is overly specific, given that what we want to explain is why the gas ends up exerting pressure P2 rather than some alternative pressure P3. Just giving the micro-explanation, without further elucidation, doesn’t convey the information that almost all trajectories compatible with the initial conditions to which the gas is subject would have produced the same result . Indeed, on one natural interpretation, the micro-explanation  misleadingly suggests  that the fact that the gas ends up exerting pressure P2 depends  in some way on the particular  set of  molecular trajectories and collisions leading from G1 to G2 that actually occurred and this of course is false. By contrast, the macroscopic strategy does not have this limitation.  From the  point of view of this paper  little turns  on whether we regard the  claim that  the new pressure is caused by the evolution from G 1to G2    as false,  or as true but misleading (or defective from the point of view of explanation) in some way .  What matters is that the macroscopic strategy coveys causally relevant information that is omitted by the microscopic strategy. 
	We can  express these observations in terms of the ideas about contrastive focus and role of tracing dependency relationships in causal explanation   described in Section 1.  When one asks for a causal explanation of why the gas is in some macroscopic state – e.g. that of exerting pressure P2, this is most naturally understood as a request for an explanation of why the gas is in that macroscopic state rather than other alternative macroscopic states –why it has pressure P2 rather  than some alternative pressure(s) Pi different from P2. The microscopic  explanation simply doesn’t answer this question, since as stated it tells us nothing about the  conditions under which such  a macroscopic alternative to P2 would have occurred. By contrast the macroscopic explanation that appeals to the macroscopic state of the gas and the ideal gas law does provide such information, since it allows us to see that if, for example, the new temperature of the gas had been T3 rather than T2, the gas would have evolved to new pressure P3 = nRT3/V. This is not to say that  the micro-explanation is entirely unexplanatory – for example, if for some reason we were interested in explaining why the gas ends up at the new equilibrium in  the exact molecular configuration G2 rather than the alternative exact molecular configuration G3, the exact configuration of the molecules at their starting point G1 and the details of their subsequent evolution would be highly relevant. But most often, this is not what we are interested in.  In the more usual case, where the intended explanandum involves a macro-contrast, the more fine grained and microscopic explanation is not automatically better.
	We can also relate these points  directly to some of the  foundational issues in the theory of explanation canvassed above. If we hold that  to explain an outcome is simply to provide a nomologically sufficient condition for its occurrence, then it will be natural conclude that the micro-explanation provides a fully satisfactory explanation for why the gas exerts pressure P2, for this explanation certainly provides a nomologically sufficient condition for this explanandum. Suppose, however, that one holds instead, as suggested in Section 1, that something more  or different  is required of a good causal explanation – that it answer a what-if-things-had-been-different  question or identify conditions such that under changes in those conditions some alternative to the explanandum would be realized  and that more generally causal explanation is a matter of tracing dependency relationships and accounting for contrasts. Then  assuming that the explanandum in which we are interested is why the gas exerts pressure P2,  the micro-explanation leaves out something of importance that is provided by a more macroscopic explanation. In other words, under the right conditions, the interventionist  conception favors causal claims and explanations involving more macroscopic variables.  This suggests that to the extent that the relationship between some candidate mental cause claim (e.g. that I causes R in the example above)  and the underlying physical/ neural physiological realizations of  the candidate cause (N1) and its effect  are like the relationship between on the one hand, pressure, volume, and temperature, and, on the other hand, some particular molecular  configuration that realizes these variables, the upper level, mental  cause claim may be preferable to the claim framed in terms of its neuro-physiological realization N1. More weakly, it seems plainly wrong-headed to think that the microscopic causal claims   that appeal  to the exact molecular configuration in the case of the gas or to  the details of the neuro-physiological realization N1 somehow compete with the more macroscopic causal claims and “exclude” these in the sense of showing them to be false.  I will return to this idea below. 
	3.2) To further explore this point, consider  the following  example, derived   from Yablo (1992).  A pigeon  has been trained to  peck at a target  when and only when presented with a red stimulus (that is a stimulus of any shade of red). Suppose that on a series of occasions the pigeon is presented with a stimulus that is a particular shade of scarlet and in each case pecks at the target. Consider the following two causal claims/causal explanations; 

(3. 2.1) The presentation of scarlet targets causes the pigeon to peck 
(3.2.2) The presentation of red targets causes the pigeon to peck. 

If we adhere to the characterization in M, then both (3. 2.1) and (3.2.2)  are true, since in both cases there is an intervention (namely one that changes the color of the target from scarlet to a non-red color) that will change whether the pigeon pecks.  Nonetheless, as Yablo argues, there is an obvious sense in which  (3. 2.1), like the micro explanation of the behavior of the ideal gas, seems inappropriately specific or  insufficiently general, in comparison with (3. 2.2). Or at least, to make a much weaker claim, it does not seem plausible that (3. 2.1) should be judged superior to (3.2.2 ) just on the grounds of its greater specificity. Even if we accept (3.2.1)  as a true causal claim, it seems misguided to regard it as in competition with (3.2.2) in the sense that acceptance of the former requires us to regard the latter as false.  The basis for these assessments again falls naturally out of the interventionist account of causation and  explanation described above. What we are usually interested in when we ask for a causal explanation or cause of the pigeon’s pecking is something that accounts for why it pecks rather than alternatively not pecking at all. There is relevant information about the conditions under which both pecking and not pecking will occur that is conveyed by (3.2.2) but not by (3. 2.1) when both are given their natural default reading.  The default reading of 3.1.2.2) with its contrastive focus made explicit is:
 
(3. 2.2*)  The contrast between the targets being red rather than not red causes the contrast between the pigeon’s pecking rather than not pecking

(3. 2.2*) thus tells us for example, that if the target had been some other shade of red besides scarlet the pigeon still would have pecked and that  for the pigeon not to peck we must produce a target that is not red at all. By contrast, the default reading of (3. 2.1) is:  

(3. 2.1*) The contrast between the targets being scarlet rather than not scarlet causes the contrast between the pigeon’s pecking rather than not pecking. 

In my idiolect, it is most natural to interpret (3.2.1/3.2.1*)  as  claiming that  the pigeon will not peck if the target is not scarlet (but still red). On this interpretation, (3. 2.1) is false. Even if we find this default interpretation uncharitable , it  remains true that (3. 2.1) tells us less than we would like to know about the full range of conditions under which the pigeon will peck or not peck​[5]​. It is again true that, under the imagined conditions, the presentation of the scarlet target is  nomologically sufficient  (given the way that the philosophy of mind literature understands the notion of “law” ) for the pigeon to peck, but this just  illustrates the point that there seems more to successful explanation or informative casual claims than the provision of nomologically sufficient conditions. 
It is also worth noting the obvious point that under a different experimental set-up in which  the pigeon was instead trained to peck only in response to the target’s being scarlet, these assessments would be reversed.  This again underscores the point that  on their most natural interpretation   (3. 2.1) and (3. 2.2) have different implications  about the manipulability relationships or the patterns of counterfactual dependency that hold in the situation of interest: (3. 2.1)  claims that we can manipulate whether the pigeon pecks by changing the target from red to not-red, while (3. 2.2) claims that merely changing whether the target is scarlet will do this.  If this is correct,  there can be no general preference for (3. 2.2) over (3. 2.1) simply on grounds of its greater specificity – the appropriateness of each will depend on such facts as whether the pigeon pecks in response to non-scarlet shades of red.   
3.3) Finally, suppose (cf. Jackson and Pettit, 2004, p. 172) that John coughs just as the conductor is about to begin his performance and the conductor becomes  irritated.   
Consider the following two claims
(3.3.1) John’s coughing caused/causally explains  the conductor’s becoming irritated
(3.3.2) Someone’s coughing caused/ causally explains  the conductor’s becoming irritated. 
A general preference for more detailed causal claims/explanations suggests that (3.3.1)  is automatically preferable to (3.3.2). Again, however, it is natural to associate these with different contrastive claims. (3.3.1) naturally suggests that the conductor’s irritation is specifically the result of John’s coughing: that the contrast between the actual situation in which John coughs and an alterative in which someone else coughs is responsible for the conductor’s irritation. (Imagine that the conductor is generally unflappable and undisturbed by coughing but has a particular animus toward John, who he correctly believes is trying to disrupt his performance). That is, the conductor would not have become irritated if anyone else had coughed. By contrast, (3.3.2) does suggest  that the conductor would have become  irritated as long as there was coughing by anyone. Which of these claims is   correct obviously depends on the empirical facts of the situation – again there are no grounds for supposing that the more specific  (3.3.1) is automatically preferable on apriori grounds to the less specific  (3.3.2).
  At a number of points above  I have framed my contentions about the superiority of  the  less specific causal claims in terms of their providing better (causal) explanations,  since this seems to me to be the most natural way of putting matters. But while my argument involves an appeal to what is sometimes called “explanatory practice”  (Robb and Heil, 2007), let me re-iterate that  the notion of explanation to which I am appealing requires the truth of the causal claims that figure in those explanations. That is, my contention throughout is that the less specific causal claims are true  (if they were not, we could not appeal to them to explain) and that regardless of what we may think about the truth of the more specific claims,  they at least don’t exclude the truth of the less specific claims.   Thus, on my view, someone who accepts that it is correct to appeal to (3.2.2) to causally explain the pigeon’s pecking cannot at the same time hold that (3.2.2) is false or that its truth is excluded by  the truth of (3.2.1). 
What do these examples have to do with mental causation? My completely unoriginal suggestion is that claims about mental or psychological causation will be true  when the relationship between mental states and their underlying realizations are relevantly like the relationships between the more macro or less specific causal claims and their underlying, more specific realizations in the examples described above​[6]​.
  As a simple illustration, consider  some research concerning the neural coding of intention to reach carried out by Richard Andersen and colleagues at Caltech (Musallam et al., 2004).  These researchers recorded from individual neurons using arrays  of electrodes implanted in the PRR (parietal reach  region) of the posterior parietal cortex in   macaque monkeys. Previous research had suggested that this region encodes what Andersen et al. call intentions to reach for specific target – that is higher order plans or goals to reach toward one target or goal rather than another (e.g. an apple  at a specific location rather than an orange at some other location)  rather than more specific instructions concerning the exact limb trajectory to be followed in reaching toward the target   – the latter information being represented elsewhere in motor areas.
 Andersen was able  to develop a program  which systematically related variations in   aggregate features of the recorded signals to variations in intentions to reach for specific goals, as revealed in reaching movements and which indeed allowed for   accurate  forecasting of reaching behavior from these signals.   His eventual hope is that paralysed  subjects will be able to control the goals toward which prosthetic limbs are directed by forming different intentions, which would then be decoded, the resulting neural signals directing the limb. From a interventionist perspective, this is about as clear a case of mental causation as one could imagine,  since the subject uses  the formation of one  intention rather than another to manipulate the position of the limb.  
  The  signals that are recorded (and which do seem to encode different intentions up to some reasonable degree of resolution)   are an aggregate of the firing rates (spikes / second)  over a temporal period from a number of individual neurons.   Like  all accounts of neural coding, this inevitably involves discarding or abstracting away from various features of the behavior of individual neurons. In particular, since  it is the aggregate behavior of  a large group of neurons that is taken to encode differences in intention,  there will be some individual variation in neuronal behavior that is consistent with relevant sameness of the aggregate profile. Moreover, the assumption, shared with most accounts of neural coding, that the crucial variable  is firing rate implies that   variations in the behavior of neurons that are consistent with their having the same firing rate, such as variations in the temporal course of their  firing, will be irrelevant to which intention is represented.   The picture that emerges is thus that there is some range of variation in the behavior of individual neurons which is   consistent with the holding of the same intention, while some other range of variation in  the behavior of individual neurons (associated with a different aggregate firing rate)  will be associated with a different intention.  In this sense the same intention may be multiply realized in somewhat different patterns of neuronal activity. 
Suppose then that  on some specific occasion t a monkey forms an intention  I1 to reach for a particular goal – call this action R1. Suppose  N11 is  the particular (token) pattern of firing in the relevant set of neurons that realizes or encodes the intention I1 on this particular occasion.   Assume also that  there are other token patterns of neural firing, N12, N13  that realize the same intention I1 on other occasions, so that I1 is multiply realized by N11, N12, etc. The preference for micro or fine grained causation that we are considering recommends that we should regard NII as the real cause of R1 on occasion t. But  this seems wrong for  the same reason that it seems wrong to say that it is the   scarlet color of the target that causes the pigeon to peck in circumstances in which the pigeon will peck at any red target  and wrong to say that  it is the specific molecular configuration G1 rather than the fact that the temperature of the gas has been increased to T2 which is responsible for its new pressure P2.  Just as  with these two examples, the causal  claim/causal explanation that appeals to N11 to explain R1 seems overly specific. It fails to convey a relevant pattern of dependence:   that there are some alternatives to N11 (namely, N12 and N13) that would have led to the same reaching behavior R1 and other alternatives (those that realize some different intention I2, associated with reaching for a different goal that would not have led to R1. Put slightly differently, Andersen’s concern in this example is in finding the cause of variations in reach   toward different goal objects – why the monkey exhibits reaching behavior R1 rather than different reaching behavior R2. According to the interventionist account, to do  this,  he needs to identify states or conditions, variations in which, when produced by interventions, would be correlated with changes from R1 to R2.   Ex hypothesi, merely citing N11 does not accomplish  this,  since it tells us nothing about the conditions under which alternatives to R1 would  be realized.    By way of contrast, appealing to the fact that the  monkey’s intention is  I1 rather than some alternative intention I2 does accomplish this, assuming (as we have been all along) that there is a stable relationship between the occurrence of I1 (however realized) and R1 and that under I2 some alternative to R1 (reaching toward a different goal) would have occurred.  
Note  that there is nothing about this argument that relies on the specifically mental (however this is understood) character of I1 in establishing its explanatory credentials with respect to R1.  The argument would proceed in the same way if we instead appealed to  neural  or physically characterized facts about the aggregate profile – call this A1-- of the firing rates that realize or correspond  to I1. In other words, insofar as this aggregate profile A1 corresponds to the different ways N11, N12, N13 of realizing I1, and A1 leads to R1 and A1 contrasts with whatever aggregate profile of neural activity A2  corresponds to the different intention 12, it will be equally appropriate to cite A1 as causing or figuring in the causal explanation for  the monkey’s exhibiting R1. 
This of course raises the question of how we should conceive of the relationship between I1 and A1—are these identical or do they bear some other relationship to one another? We will explore some aspects of this issue in section 6 below. Here I  confine myself to the following  observation:  insofar as A1 and 11 enter  into exactly the same manipulability or dependency  relationships with respect to R1, it is natural (from an interventionist point of view)  to think of them as involving the same rather than competing causal claims with respect to R1. That is,   for it to be the case that the claim that (3.4)   I1 causes R1  and the claim that (3.5)   A1 causes R1 to be competing claims about the causes of R1 (in the sense that at best one of  (3.4-3.5)  can be correct) it must be the case that they make inconsistent predictions about what would happen to R1 under some possible set of interventions​[7]​. Prima facie, at least, (3.4) and (3.5)   do not do this.   If  this appearance is correct, they are not competing causal claims in any sense that requires us to choose between them.  Hence, whatever view we take about the relationship between I1 and A1 must be consistent with this fact. 
			   		4. 

In  this section  I want to add some clarifications to the argument in section 3 and also to place the argument in a more general context. First, some philosophers​[8]​ have argued, with respect to set-ups of the sort under discussion, as follows: (4.1) If  the realizer N11 of I1 that actually occurred had not occurred, then some other alternative realizer of I1-- say N12 -- would have occurred instead and would have caused R1. They take this to support the claim   that I1  causes (or at least plays some causal role in the occurrence of) R1. This is not the argument made above and I see no reason to accept the counterfactual (4.1)​[9]​. The argument that I give above is that we can conclude that I1 causes R1 because of the truth of various interventionist counterfactuals linking the occurrence of I1 to R1 and the occurrence of alternatives to I1 to alternatives to R1. This argument does not depend upon any claims about what would have happened if N11 had not occurred, although it does of course depend on claims about what would have happened if11 had not occurred.
Next  some remarks about the role played by considerations having to do with supervenience and multiple realizability in the arguments just described:  In the examples considered in section 3,  upper level properties that  are causally relevant to other level properties supervene on and are multiply realized by lower level properties. It is  important to realize, however, that what establishes a  role for the  upper level property—again let’s call it M1 – in the causation of a second upper level property M2   is not  just  the multiple realizability of M1 and M2 per se (and not even the conjunction of multiple realizability with the existence of laws that in some way link realizers of M1 to realizers of M2) .  Instead, what is required is the  combination  of  the right sort of multiple realizability  with  the existence of a relationship between M1 and M2 such that different values of M1 are systematically associated with different values of M2 and where this relationship is stable or invariant under some range of  variations in different lower level realizations of those properties, when these are produced by interventions. In other words, what is required is the existence of a relationship that both involves a dependency between the upper level variables (different values of M1, produced by interventions map   into different values of M2) and that is realization independent in the sense that it continues to stably hold for a range of  different realizers of these values of M1 and M2.  It is the presence of this  sort of realization independent dependency relationship  (hereafter RIDR) that  ensures that  interventions that change M1 are stably associated with changes in M2 -- hence that M1 causes M2. ​[10]​  
To illustrate the significance of this point consider the following  example.  An ordinary, fair roulette wheel (the operation of which is deterministic at a micro level)  is spun by a croupier C. C has a set of possible hand movements  Bi for putting the wheel in motion – he can start the wheel   at one of a number of positions and he can spin the wheel with  more or less force or momentum. Even if the Bi are finely grained from a macroscopic point of view (e.g. they correspond to the maximally fine movements that C can distinguish or control), each Bi will be multiply realized by a range of different exact positions and momenta for the wheel. Similarly,  whether the ball  ends up  in a red or black slot will be multiply realized.   
If the wheel is fair, C will be unable to control or manipulate, by employing one set of hand movements Bj rather than another set Bk, whether the ball will land in a red slot or a black slot—indeed he will be unable to even influence the probability of this happening. For all the different possible Bi, the probability of red will be the same—one half. Consider those occasions on which C pushes the wheel with the specific motion Bk and on which the ball ends in a red slot R.  On each of these occasions Bk and R  presumably will have different micro realizations and, moreover, for each such micro realization of Bk, there will be a law linking it to the micro-realization of R that occurs. (Remember this is a deterministic system). However, within an interventionist framework, it is not true that 
(4.2) Imposing motion Bk on the wheel causes the ball to fall in a red slot.
The reason for this is two-fold. First, there are no stable upper level relationships of the form
(4.3) If C pushes the wheel with   motion Bi, the ball will land in a red slot.
Instead, when C employs Bi, (for any value of i) whether the ball ends up in a red or black slot depends on the specific  micro-realization of Bi that is imposed: generalizations of form (4.3) are not realization independent.  Second, there  are  stable generalizations of the form
(4.4) If C pushes the wheel with motion Bi, the probability the  ball will land in a red slot is p.
That is, motions of type Bi do endow the ball with a stable probability of landing in the red slot. However, all alternative possible motions also endow the ball with the same probability of landing red—thus, there are no interventions on the Bi that make a difference for where the ball ends up or for the probability of where it ends up. In other words, the relationship between C’s behavior and the final position of the ball is not what we called  a RIDR, and this is so despite the fact that both of these are “multiply realized” The reason for this has to do with the character of the underlying physics governing the wheel—what matters is not just the existence of some set of deterministic  laws linking the initial conditions of the wheel to the outcome but rather very  specific features of these laws and how they relate to the macroscopic predicates used to characterize the behavior of the wheel ​[11]​.  
	In each of the examples considered in Section 3, we in effect assumed that we were dealing with systems that (with respect to the relationships of interest) did not behave like the roulette wheel. For example, in the case of the gas, we assumed  both that all (or more strictly virtually all)  of the different microstates that  realize the same temperature T2 will have the same stable effect on other macroscopic variables like the new pressure measurement P2 and   that there are alternatives to T2 – e.g., alternative temperature T3 such that all the different micro-realizations of T3 lead to different pressure measurements P3. (In fact, both these claims are roughly true, as an empirical matter, and statistical mechanics gives us some insight into why they are true.) Similarly, in the discussion of Andersen’s research, we assumed that all of the different possible neural realizations of the intention I1 led stably  (assuming the right background circumstances) to  the same behavior R1, and that the neural realizations of the appropriately different intention I2 would lead to different behavior R2.
As we have seen, discussions of the causal role of mental and other upper level properties have tended to focus on whether it follows just from considerations having to do with multiple realizability (and the absence of type identities )  that such properties are casually inert. I have argued that this conclusion does not follow. However,  undercutting this conclusion certainly does not by itself vindicate  claims about the causal efficacy of upper level properties, including mental properties. We  also need to ask, in connection with each upper level causal claim,  whether the additional requirements embodied in RIDR are likely to be satisfied. This is a non-trivial empirical question that must be answered on a case by case basis: it is certainly not obvious that the answer to this question is “yes” for many claims of mental causation.   I will return briefly to this issue in Section 7 below.   
  Finally, the general form of the solution  described  in Section 3 to the problem of how mental properties can play a causal role is not original with me. Broadly similar proposals have been advanced by Yablo (1992) and by Petit and Jackson (2004), among others. Yablo describes his proposal in terms of the requirement that causes fit with or be “proportional” to their effects – that they be just “enough” for their effects, neither omitting too much relevant detail nor containing  too much irrelevant detail. In this terminology, I1 fits with (or is proportional to) R1 in  a way that N11 does (is) not, since the latter involves too much irrelevant detail.   However, Yablo’s treatment relies heavily on essentialist metaphysics in explaining what  is involved in a cause being proportional to its effect. I think that this essentialist metaphysics is not necessary and that the intuition behind the requirement of proportionality need only  appeal to the considerations invoked in Section 1—an interventionist account of causation, contrastive focus and so on.  Roughly speaking, a cause variable will be “proportional” to an effect variable    when the pattern of dependence of all alternative possible states of the effect on alternative possible states of the cause is exhibited and there are no  additional “irrelevant distinctions”   among alternative states of the cause variable – irrelevant in the sense that these alternatives are not associated with differences in the effect variable​[12]​.
  Pettit’s and Jackson’s  discussion of mental causation is organized around their  account of “program explanation” and an associated notion of causal relevance (which they also associate with “instrumental effectiveness”  -- see below). A mental state such as the belief that p is causally relevant to some effect A if  “variations in how [this mental state    is realized remains consistent with invariance in the appearance of the effect [A, of this mental state]” (2004,  p. 2.). If we interpret this characterization of what it is for a mental state to cause or be causally relevant to an outcome along interventionist, RIDR  lines  (that is, that different interventions on the same mental state that involving  different realizers of this state lead to the same effect and that the realizations of   different mental states, also produced by interventions, lead to  different effects), then  the characterization to be essentially the same as  (or at least very close to) the characterization that offered above. However, Jackson and Pettit  also distinguish sharply between causal relevance   and what they call causal efficacy , where “ a casually efficacious property with regard to an effect is a property in virtue of whose instantiation, at least in part, the effect occurs” . They associate causal efficacy with the notion of causal “production” and   suggest that “relations of  causal  efficacy” may be “restricted to  certain properties of fundamental physics” (2004, p. 61)  and perhaps that “causal efficacy is a relation between forces” . (2004, fn. 25, p.61). Causal relevance is thus a broader notion than causal efficacy: casually efficacious properties are causally relevant but a property can be causally relevant or instrumentally effective without being  efficacious.   According to Jackson and Pettit, this is true of mental states; they are causally relevant to behavior but not in themselves causally efficacious in producing behavior. Instead it is the particular physical realization of the mental state on a given occasion which is causally efficacious in producing behavior. They write: 
no matter how the notion of causal efficacy is understood, it is distinct from the notion of instrumental effectiveness. A property will count as instrumentally effective vis-à-vis a particular effect, if it would have been a good tactic for producing the effect to realize that property. But such effectiveness does not entail efficacy: it does not mean that the effect occurred in virtue of the instantiation of the property. (2004, p. 120)
  Jackson and Petit suggest  that mental states like  beliefs  do not themselves produce behavior but  instead  program” for the production of behavior in the sense that  they “(non causally) ensure that no matter how it is realized, things will be arranged at the neural and more basic levels , so that behavior is more or less reliably bound to appear”. (2004, p.2) 
 This distinction between causal efficacy and relevance and the associated idea that explanations that appeal to beliefs  provide only information about  relevance but not efficacy relations  provides a natural opening for critics such as Kim, 1998. Kim claims that  a true vindication of the causal status of the mental requires  showing that mental states are causally efficacious rather than merely causally relevant; since Pettit and Jackson concede  that on their approach mental states are not causally efficacious in producing behavior, they are, according to Kim, really epiphenomenalists about the mental. (Kim, 1998, p. 75)
Many other philosophers similarly distinguish between casual relevance and what they suppose to be a stronger notion of causal efficacy, (although with a different understanding of the latter notion than Jackson and Petit)  and also contend, like Kim, that showing that  mental states are causes requires showing that  they are casually efficacious in this stronger sense rather than merely  causal relevant to their effects . Often (and confusingly​[13]​), however,   what is meant  by “efficacy” seems to amount simply  to  nomological sufficiency: a’s being F is causally efficacious in making it the case that b is G if and only if a’s  possession of  F is nomologically sufficient for b’s possession of G. Consider  the following view, which Robb and Heil, 2007  ascribe to Jerry Fodor: 
On Fodor's view, mental properties can be relevant to behavior in a stronger sense [than the sense captured by counterfactual accounts of causal relevance, like the interventionist account], a sense in which they are sufficient for their effects and in this way "make a difference". Fodor spells out this sufficiency in terms of laws: a property makes a difference if "it's a property in virtue of the instantiation of which the occurrence of one event is nomologically sufficient for the occurrence of another".   
There is of course nothing to prevent someone from introducing  “causal efficacy” as a technical term which is simply defined or stipulated to be identical with nomological sufficiency. However, we need to realize that this  notion is very far removed from  the various notions of causation or causal explanation that are  commonly used in either ordinary life  or in science. Instead, the commonly used causal notions all embody in some way or other the  requirement that causes must be relevant (where relevance is understood along the interventionist or counterfactual lines described above) to their effects. (This is reflected in our reluctance to accept the judgment that the fact that   hexing salt is causally efficacious in producing dissolution in water despite the fact that the former is nomologically sufficient for the latter).  Moreover, contrary to the view that  Robb and Heil attribute to Fodor, it is  wrong to equate the idea of a cause’s making a difference to its effect with the idea that the cause is nomologically sufficient for the effect. The claim that a  cause “makes   a difference” to an effect requires that some claim be true about how the effect would be absent or different if the cause were absent or different—the whole idea of a cause as a difference-maker must embody some idea about the cause being one way rather than another making a difference to the effect. The idea of nomological sufficiency says nothing about this: it is a claim about what would happen if the cause were present but says nothing about what would happen if the cause were absent or different.  Nothing in the idea of nomological sufficiency taken in itself requires that causes be difference-makers (this is the point of the Salmon counterexamples to the DN model discussed in Section 3) and  to the extent that difference-making is crucial to the notion of causation, causal efficacy (understood as nomological sufficiency) seems   to leave out something central to any legitimate notion of causation. Moreover, it isn’t, as it were, just a linguistic or conceptual accident that our current notion(s) of cause is (are) tied in this way to the requirement that  causes should be difference makers or relevant to their effects in what Robb and Heil call the counterfactual sense—there are good reasons related to the goals  of inquiry for this requirement.  
 One way of bringing out this last point is to consider what research like that conducted by Musallam  et al. would look like if its focus or goal were simply the identification of conditions that are causally efficacious (in the sense of nomological sufficiency) in the production of reaching behavior.  If this were the goal, it would be acceptable to cite the entire state of the whole brain (or any part of it that includes the PRR as a proper part) during the time immediately preceding the behavior of interest, for this will assuredly be  a nomologically sufficient condition for the behavior, if anything is. Of course, neither  Andersen  nor any other   neuroscientist  does this. Andersen’s goal, as he puts it, is to identify “intention specific” neurons—that is to identify  the specific  neurons variations in the state of which correlate  with the monkey’s intentions and which hence are responsible for or make a difference for the monkey’s behavior. Then, among, these neurons he wants to identify those specific features of their behavior (whether this has  to do with some aggregate function of spike rate or whatever) which encode different intentions. Other states of the monkey’s brain  in, e.g. occipital cortex that don’t covary with changes in the monkey’s intentions are irrelevant to this task and hence are ignored. This concern with neural specificity  falls naturally out of a concern with causal relevance or difference –making but is lost if we focus just on the identification of nomologically sufficient conditions for behavior.
It seems clear that part of the motivation for introducing a notion of causal efficacy or production that is distinct from the notion of causal relevance (or instrumental effectiveness) derives from the idea that information about causal relevance relationships and relationships relevant to manipulation or “instrumental effectiveness” reflect a  metaphysically thin, weak,  or insubstantial notion of cause and casual explanation. Thus  Kim, in the course of commenting on Jackson and Petit’s claim that explanations that appeal to mental states  involve causal relevance but not causal efficacy, says that this involves “giving up on mental causation and a robust notion of mental causal explanation”  and substituting for it “ a looser and weaker model of explanatory relevance”   that is not (properly speaking) causal at all (Kim, 1998, p. 75). A similar thought that causal relevance, understood along  interventionist lines,   involves only a “weak” notion of causation is reflected in the passage from Robb and Heil quoted  above.   Those who invoke the notion of   causal efficacy are thus motivated by the thought that this   is  a “stronger” or metaphysically richer  notion– a notion with more “push” or “umph”    than mere causal relevance.  The contrary view which is embodied in the interventionist account is that all there is to our various  notions of causation is captured by interventionist counterfactuals and information about manipulability relationships – there is no  distinct, richer  notion of cause of the sort that Robb and Heil and Jackson and Pettit gesture at. If so, it is of course not a ground for complaint or concern that mental states fail to be causally efficacious in this stronger sense.
I have already recorded my grounds for skepticism that nomological sufficiency is a good candidate for this “richer” notion of cause. What about Jackson and Pettit’s association of  causal efficacy with relationships that figure in fundamental physics? It is unclear exactly how to interpret this suggestion, but if what it means is that the only true claims about causal efficacy are those that  explicitly invoke fundamental physical force laws or other relevant notions from fundamental physics, then, as they themselves explicitly recognize, most causal claims in most areas of science are not true claims about causal efficacy. For example,  as they note, even neurally realistic computational models in neurobiology will not  be claims about the causal efficacy of one neural state  in producing another, and ingesting arsenic will not be causally efficacious in producing death  -- instead these are mere claims about casual relevance​[14]​. An additional, quite general problem is that , at least  according to a number of  philosophers of physics, causal notions (of any kind) do not play a fundamental or foundational role in fundamental physics – indeed, in some respects fundamental physical theories are quite resistant to causal  interpretation.  To the extent that this  assessment is correct, it will be a mistake to locate the ground or basis for a metaphysically rich notion of cause in basic physics​[15]​     
In view of these observations it is natural to wonder whether  vindication of the idea that mental states can be causes really requires showing that  they are  causes  in   some   stronger sense  that goes beyond causal relevance. If mental states have the same status qua causes of behavior as arsenic ingestion has qua cause of death, why isn’t that causation enough? Indeed, although  it is of course an empirical question what ordinary people (or scientists) have in mind   when they invoke the notion of mental causation,  it is  far from clear that either group  thinks that mental causation requires anything more than the  instrumental effectiveness of the mental. Consider again a paralysed subject who is able to move a prosthetic limb (or a cursor on a screen) merely by thinking or by forming the right intention. Would most lay people and scientists   think that this sort of “instrumental efficacy”  is insufficient for true mental causation, with something metaphysically richer being required in addition? I suspect not. Certainly if we ask why we should care about whether there is mental causation, this looks very much like an issue about instrumental  effectiveness: the concern is that we are  deluded in our common sense belief that our intentions, desires, beliefs play a role in controlling our mental life and behavior, that we can change our behavior by changing these, that we can manipulate the mental states and behavior of others by changing other mental states of theirs and so on. This concern is adequately addressed by showing that mental states are causes in the sense captured by the interventionist account.  We are thus left with the possibility that the only people who think that  vindicating the  claim that mental states are causes  requires showing that they are causes in a richer, more metaphysical  sense are  certain philosophers of mind.   
                                    		  5.  
The Causal Exclusion Problem: So far I have focused on trying to provide intuitive motivation for the claim that  lower level causal claims (involving, e.g., physical or neural properties) do not always   undercut or render superfluous more upper level (e.g. mental) causal claims. I turn now to  an examination of a more specific argument, the  so-called causal  exclusion argument (or problem), which is probably the most widely discussed  attempt in the literature to motivate the claim that unless mental and physical properties are type- identical, it follows from various uncontroversial empirical premises that mental states are causally inert. There are a number of versions of this argument in the literature ;  I will focus on a version of the argument due to Kim. Kim’s claim is this:  

Causal efficacy of mental properties is inconsistent with the joint acceptance of the following four claims: (i) physical causal closure (ii) causal exclusion, (iii) mind-body supervenience, (iv) mental/physical property dualism – the claim that mental properties are irreducible to physical properties. (Kim, 2005)  

The physical closure principle (i) claims that “if a physical event has a cause at t, then it has a physical cause at t.” The principle of causal exclusion (ii) states that “ if an event e has a sufficient cause c at t, no event at t distinct from c can be a cause of e, (unless this is a genuine case of causal over-determination)”. Principle (iv) is supposed to follow from the thesis  that mental properties are multiply realizable by physical properties; hence mental properties cannot be identified with any particular physical property.  The causal exclusion argument then goes as follows (I lightly paraphrase from Kim, 2005, pp 39ff):
 (1) Assume, for the sake of argument that some mental property M causes a distinct mental property M* 
(2) Since the mental is supervenient  on the physical, M* will have some physical property P* as its supervenience base and similarly M will have some physical property P as its supervenience base
(3) Then M causes M* by causing its supervenience  base P*
(4) P causes P*
(5) M  P (this is simply the claim (iv) above that mental and physical properties are not identical)
(6) Both P and M cause P* (from (3) and (4))
(7) By the causal exclusion principle (ii) this must be a case of causal overdetermination. 
But (8) it is enormously implausible that most or all cases of mental causation involve overdeterminination 
Therefore (9) the claim (1) that M causes M* must be rejected. As Kim puts it, “The putative mental case, M, is excluded by the physical cause P. That is, P, not M is a cause of M*”.  (Kim, 2005  p. 43) 
 I assume that (i) physical closure is uncontroversial and relatedly, that  premise (4) above is as well.    Moreover (8) also seems prima facie convincing, at least if over-determination is taken in its standard sense – that is, as involving   two independent causes,  each sufficient for the same effect, as when two riflemen shoot a victim simultaneously, with each shot being causally sufficient for death.​[16]​. Kim’s justification for (3) is as follows:.
(1) and (2) [above] together give rise to a tension when we consider the question “Why is M* instantiated on this occasion? What is responsible for, and explains, the fact that M* occurs on this occasion?” For there are two seemingly exclusionary answers: (a) “Because M caused M* to instantiate on this occasion,” and (b) “Because P*, a supervenience base of M*, is instantiated on this occasion.” …: Given that P* is present on this occasion, M* would be there no matter what happened before; as M*’s supervenience base, the instantiation of P* at t in and of itself necessitates M*’s occurrence at t. This would be true even if M*’s putative cause, M, had not occurred- unless, that is, the occurrence of M had something to do with the occurrence of P* on this occasion. This last observation points to a simple and natural way of dissipating  the tension created by (a) and (b): (3) M caused M* by causing its supervenience base P*. (Kim, 2005,  pp 39-40).  
Put more informally, the argument is simply that  if we allow mental states or properties to be causes, we end up with too many causes:  P must cause P* because of the casual closure of the physical and P* must be by itself sufficient for M* since M* supervenes  on P*.  Also, on the seemingly unavoidable  principle that causal sufficiency  is  “transmitted through” the supervenience relation, P must also be causally sufficient for M*. But then it would appear that “all of the causal work” required to produce M* has already been done by  P (and P* ) and there is “no work left over”  for M to do in causing M*. So M is  rendered casually superfluous or inert by the physical causes P and P*.
Kim claims that the picture of the relationship between the mental and physical that emerges from the exclusion argument is this:  
P is a cause of P*, with M and M* supervening respectively on P and P*. There is a single underlying causal process in this picture, and this process connects two physical properties, P and P*. The correlations between M and M* and between M and P* are by no means accidental or coincidental; they are lawful and counterfactual-sustaining regularities arising out of M’s and M*’s supervenience on the causally linked P and P*. These observed correlations give us an impression of causation; however, that is only an appearance, and there is no more causation here than between two successive shadows cast by a moving ear or two succession symptoms of a developing pathology. This is a simple and elegant picture, metaphysically speaking, but it will prompt howls of protest from those who think that it has given away something very special and precious, namely the causal efficacy of our minds.   (2005, p. 21)
Robb and Heil, 2007  give the following, slightly different formulation of the exclusion argument:
How could functional properties make a causal difference? Suppose being in pain is a matter of being in a particular functional state. That is, being in pain is a matter of possessing a particular functional property, F. F is realized in your case by, say, some neurological property, N. Now, N is unproblematically relevant to producing various behavioral effects. N is relevant to your reaching for aspirin, say. But then what causal work is left for F to do? It seems to be causally idle, "screened off" by the work of N. This version of the problem of mental causation has appeared in various guises: …. It is called the exclusion problem because it looks as if the physical properties that realize mental properties exclude the latter from causal relevance​[17]​. 
If my discussion in section 3 is correct, there must be something wrong with this whole line of reasoning After all, in the pigeon example, the target’s property of being red  supervenes on but is not identical with the property of its being scarlet. However, it seems clearly misguided to conclude from this  that  any role for the redness of the target in causing the pigeon’s pecking is “excluded”  or pre-empted by the  causal activity of the scarlet.  Similarly for the other examples in  section 3. One way of diagnosing what is wrong with the argument focuses on its apparent​[18]​ reliance on the assumption (A) that C’s causing E (or C’s being causally relevant to E)  is to be understood in terms of C’s being a sufficient condition of some kind ( “nomologically” or “causally sufficient” ) for E.  Kim is right that once one makes this assumption and combines it with property dualism (5 above), one faces a major problem in finding a causal role for the mental, for the obvious reason that if some state or event  M   has  a mental cause M*(and hence M* is, according to A, causally sufficient for M) ,   then since there is also  is a physically sufficient condition  P (on which M supervenes) for M* which is not identical with M*,  there must be two distinct sets of causally sufficient conditions (hence according to (A) two sets of causes) for whatever happens—one mental and the other physical.  Moreover, the physically sufficient conditions must, given supervenience, be  causally sufficient for whatever happens mentally, assuming (as we did above and as seems uncontroversial) that if a condition is causally sufficient for some property it is also causally  sufficient for whatever supervenes on that property​[19]​.  It is thus hard to see what   possible role there could   be for mental causation, barring some apparently unintuitive systematic over-determination?  It would seem that physical causation already supplies all of the sufficient conditions (and hence all of the causation) that are (is) needed. By definition, a sufficient condition does not require anything “more” to do its work. 




A More General Perspective.  Rather than further belaboring these points, I instead want to  use the interventionist framework  to explore the more general issue  of how  different  views we might adopt about the relationship between the mental and the physical interact with and constrain the causal status of the mental. Among other things, this will give us an additional perspective on what is wrong with the causal exclusion argument.  In what follows, I will represent the relationship between mental events and the neural events that realize them by means of a double headed vertical arrow      and the existence of an ordinary causal relationship from X to Y by means of an arrow from X to Y: XY.  
The general set up with which we will be concerned thus can be represented as 

        Figure 6.1
M1 and M2 are mental states and N1 and N2 are the neural states that realize them, which we allow to be disjunctive to accommodate MRT.   Assume it is uncontroversial that, as indicated in the diagram, N1 causes N2. The question that will interest  us is the following: Under what conditions, if any, and for what interpretation of the supervenience relation   , are we justified in drawing an  from M1 to M2 or from M1 to N2 -- that is in regarding M1 as a cause of these variables?  
Suppose, for starters, that      represents an ordinary causal relationship—that is, mental states are caused by their neural realizations, which are thus  distinct from them. This is a minority position in the philosophical literature, but is adopted (under some interpretation of “cause”) by at least one prominent figure – John Searle. By the rules given in Section 1, if M1 causes M2, it should be possible to carry out an intervention I on M1 and this intervention I should break the causal relationship between M1 and N1 . If, under such an  intervention,  M2  changes, then M1 causes M2. (Cf. Figure 6.2) However,  this is not a coherent scenario from the point of view of most  philosophers of mind, including anyone who thinks that the mental is supervenient on the physical   First, according to the supervenience thesis, the relationship between M1 and N1 is unbreakable. According to the interventionist account, if N1 causes M1, then an intervention on M1 should change M1 while leaving N1 unchanged.  However,  this violates supervenience since it involves a change in mental state with no corresponding change in realizing neural state. In addition, if the value of M2 changes under some intervention on M1 (as it must if M1 causes M2), the relationship between M2 and its supervenience base N2 would also be disrupted, which is again contrary to the supervenience thesis.

Figure 6.2
Can we get around this problem by supposing that M1  does not cause M2 directly but only via N2, as in Figure 6.3?   

Figure 6.3
No. This still requires that an intervention on M1 change M1 independently of   N1 which, as we have seen, violates supervenience. In addition, this scenario  would involve breaking  the arrow from N1  to N2 or at least making the value of N2  depend on M1 as well as N1, violating the causal closure of the physical. So it looks like there is no acceptable interpretation of      as “causes”. 
Note that in assessing the causal role of M1  with respect to M2 under a scenario in which the supervenience relationship between N1  and M1 is interpreted as “causes”,  we asked about the truth of the following counterfactual: 
 (C) What would happen to M2 if we were to vary M1 by means of an intervention while holding N1 fixed?  
 (C) makes perfectly good sense (and is the appropriate counterfactual to use for determining whether M1 causes M2)  if  the relationship between N1 and M1 is causal. The reason for this is that under this interpretation of the supervenience relation, N1 is an alternative  cause of M2 in addition to M1 and this alternative cause   is  correlated with M1, since N1 causes M1 and, moreover, N1 affects M2 via a route that does not go through M1. ( This is because N1 causes N2  which in turn causes M2). In general,  as we have seen (cf. Section 1) , if X and Y are  candidates for causes of Z which are correlated and which affect Z if at all by independent routes, and we wish to assess the casual influence of X on Z , we must control or correct for the causal influence of Y on Z.  Thus, in particular, in assessing the causal influence that M1 by itself has on M2,  we must “control”  for the correlated  alternative cause N1 of M2.    We do this within the interventionist framework by “breaking”  the causal relationship between M1 and N1 and then varying M1 independently of N1 by intervening on M1.  In just the same way, in the scenario in which parental SES (E) was (or was suspected of being)  a common cause of  school attendance P  and scholastic achievement S, we test for whether there is a causal relationship from P to S by  intervening to vary   P while holding  E fixed and noting whether there is any change in S.  It is much more dubious, however, that  on other (non-causal) interpretations of the supervenience relationship, use of counterfactuals like C are sensible or appropriate for assessing the causal influence of M1 on M2.​[20]​ 
Suppose, for example, that the supervenience relationship    corresponds to something like “type identity”. Then presumably everyone would agree that the counterfactual question (C ) makes no sense or at least is inappropriate for capturing the causal influence of M1 on M2. On this  interpretation of the supervenience relationship, M1 just is N1 differently described and the antecedent of the counterfactual (C) has no coherent “interventionist” interpretation. Put slightly differently,   if M1 and N1 are identical, then to carry out an intervention on M1 is also to carry out the very same intervention on N1, so that there is no possibility of crediting M1 and N1 with different effects under this intervention.  To attempt to use (C)  in this sort of case  as a test for whether M1 is causally inert with respect to M2 is to illegitimately import a test which would be appropriate if N1  were a cause of M1 into the very different situation in which N1 is not a cause of but is rather identical with M1.  
A similar conclusion seems warranted for at least some interpretations of the supervenience relationship that do not involve type identity– e.g., when the relationship is that of a determinate property to a determinable property. Consider once more the example of the pigeon trained to respond to red and   presented with a particular shade of scarlet:

Here Red supervenes on Scarlet and Pecks supervenes on P1 which (we may suppose) is some lower level   description which   “realizes” pecking on this particular occasion. It seems clear that it would be inappropriate to employ the following C- like counterfactual question to assess the causal influence of Red on Pecking:
(6.1) If (a) an intervention were to occur that changes the target from Red to not Red while the target remains fixed at scarlet, would (b) the response change from pecking to not pecking?
The reason why this question is inappropriate  for  determining whether  Red causes Pecking is again that the antecedent (a) in (6.1) describes  a  situation that for conceptual reasons  cannot be realized by any intervention or combination of interventions—again this is a counterfactual whose antecedent lacks a coherent interventionist interpretation. Assuming that scarlet is a particular shade of red, it is not possible (for conceptual or semantic reasons having to do with the relationship between scarlet and red) to   intervene to change the color of a scarlet target from red to not red, while at the same time retaining the scarlet color of the target. As in the previous case, it would be a mistake to infer from this impossibility that changing of the color from red to not red is causally inert with respect to pecking, and that the real cause of the pecking is the lower level, more specific property scarlet.
	This last example shows that the cases in which it is inappropriate to apply a counterfactual test like  (C) are not confined to cases in which the upper level property and the property on which it supervenes are identical: other sorts of  relationships can make the test inappropriate as well. Does   this same conclusion then hold whenever one property supervenes on another, including when a mental property supervenes on its physical realizer?  Obviously, this depends on exactly how the supervenience relationship is understood. Those who invoke the notion of   supervenience, particularly in the context of the mind-brain relationship,   often think of this relationship as embodying a very strong kind of necessity – e.g. “metaphysical necessity”, whatever that may be.  That is, it is claimed that it is metaphysically impossible for two subjects to differ with respect to their mental properties while sharing the same physical properties. To the extent that this  or some comparably strong notion such as logical or conceptual impossibility is intended, a scenario in which we imagine intervening to change M1 while holding the value of N1 fixed again seems inappropriate for assessing the casual efficacy or inertness of M1​[21]​.
	Before leaving the exclusion argument, there are several other features of Kim’s discussion that are worth examining. Consider first his contention that  granting the premises of  the exclusion argument, it follows that  mental causation is “epiphenomenal” – that the relationship between one mental state and another is like the relationship between  the successive positions of a shadow cast by a physical body or like successive images in a mirror. In these two cases, the successive positions of the shadow and the successive images exert no causal influence on each other; instead these are effects of the successive states of some physical object, with the earlier state P1 of the object exerting a causal influence on the later state P2:

Shadow 1 (Image 1)         Shadow 2 (Image 2)     

P1                                               P2 





where each of the arrows represents an ordinary causal relationship.  
Is 6.4 a good analogy for the relationship between the mental and the physical​[22]​? A causal structure of the sort portrayed in Figure 6.4 makes distinctive predictions about what would happen under various interventions. Suppose we were to intervene on the state of shadow 1, while leaving the state of the body P1 undisturbed.  If Figure 6.4 correctly describes the causal structure with which we are dealing, there should be no change in the state of shadow 2. (Operationally, this might be done by partly blocking the light source that helps to create shadow 1 at time t1 in such a way that this shadow is altered but P1 is unchanged.  If the block is then removed at t2 (i.e., if there is no separate intervention on shadow 2), there should be no corresponding change in the state of shadow 2.) On the other hand, if we were to intervene to alter the state of the physical object P1, there should be, according to Figure 6.4, a corresponding change in both P2 and shadow 2.  
	If the relationships described in Figure 6.4 are like the relationship between the mental and physical (that is, if mental states are epiphenomenal and causally inert with respect to each other in the way that the successive states of a shadow are, with all of   










That is, in Figure 6.5, (i)  it should be possible to  intervene  to change  M1 independently of P1  and the result of any such intervention should be that there is  no change in M2, while  (ii) there should be interventions  that change  P1, independently of M1, and which change P2 (and M2). But, as we have already seen, anyone who holds that the mental supervenes on the physical (including both supporters and critics of the exclusion argument) , agrees that  (i) doesn’t  hold, since   it is impossible to intervene to change M1 independently of P1. So, at least within an interventionist framework, it is misguided to think that the supervenience of the mental on the physical implies that the relationship between mental states is like the relationship between the successive positions of a shadow; on the contrary, supervenience is inconsistent with such a construal. 
	Similar objections apply to some of the other ways in which Kim and others describe (or consider describing) the relationship between mental and physical.  As we have seen, many philosophers worry that if there are mental causes, then this would require a bizarre and implausible kind of causal over-determination -- the physical states that realize the causal effects of mental states would be caused both by mental states and by physical states.  
	To assess the appropriateness of this description, consider a paradigmatic case of causal over-determination: two riflemen each shoot separate bullets  that simultaneously strike the heart of a victim, killing him, where each bullet by itself, in the absence of the other, would have caused  victim’s death. Although I lack the space for detailed discussion, within an interventionist framework, the presence of this sort of causal over-determination  is  signaled by the truth of a group of counterfactuals, given the usual interventionist interpretation:  (a) (b) If bullet one (two) had not hit the victim but bullet two (one) had struck his heart, victim still would have died. (c) If neither bullet had struck victim, he would not have died. It is crucial to this analysis that the two shooters affect the victim by means of separate or independent casual mechanisms or processes—it is this that makes it sensible to talk about what would happen to the victim if one of these processes had not occurred, but the other had.  For example, in the scenario as described, it makes sense to suppose that one of the rifleman shoots (this shot resulting from an intervention) while the second doesn’t or that the second bullet is deflected in flight. But an analogous account does not apply to the alleged over-determination by both mental and physical causes—again, assuming a well-behaved supervenience relationship, it is impossible that the physical cause be present but the putative mental cause that supervenes on it be absent. Thus the counterfactuals that give sense to the overdetermination present in the rifleman case  lack any clear sense in the   cases in which there is a worry about the possibility of  mental/ physical overdetermination​[23]​. 
	A similar point holds for Kim’s claim that given the premises of the exclusion argument, physical causes “pre-empt” any mental causes. In a paradigmatic case  of pre-emption, rifleman one fires first, his bullet striking and killing the victim, who is already dead by the time he is hit by  the bullet from rifleman two, which would have killed the victim in the absence of the bullet from rifleman one. Again within  an interventionist framework, certain counterfactuals will hold that allow us to make sense of what this pre-emption involves. For example, holding fixed the path and time of  the first bullet, victim’s death is not counterfactually dependent on whether the second rifleman fires​[24]​. Again the analogues to these counterfactuals have impossible or incoherent antecedents when mental/physical supervenience holds, suggesting that whatever may be the correct way to conceive of the causal role of the mental under such supervenience, “pre-emption” of the mental by the physical is not the right picture.
	In all three  sets of claims about the causal status of the mental  (that mental states are epiphenomenal, that they are pre –empted, that they are potentially at least, over-determining causes), causal descriptions are used that make  perfectly good sense in some situations.  However, the features of these situations that warrant the use of these descriptions  are not present in contexts in which mental states are supervenient on physical states. I conclude that all three descriptions are inappropriate in the latter contexts. 
   						7.

In section 4, I  observed that  within an interventionist  framework  causation between upper level properties requires that there be dependency  relationships  between those properties that exhibit some degree of stability  under different lower level realizations of those properties. Whether and to what extent such stability is present  is an empirical question that depends both on the upper level relationship and the nature of their realizers and the generalizations governing them. I want to conclude this essay by suggesting that to the extent there  are issues about the reality and extent of  mental causation, these have to do with such empirical consideration, rather than with the  very general arguments for the casual inertness of the mental discussed in sections 3-5.
Consider again the relationship (7.1) between the push communicated to the roulette wheel and the color on which ball lands  and the  relationship (7.2) between the  pressure, volume and temperature of a good approximation to an ideal gas. These represent two  extremes: (7.1) is extremely  sensitive to the exact micro details of how the push is implemented while for virtually  micro-realizations of its macroscopic variables  (7.2) will continue to hold. The question of whether various candidates for  mental causal relationships are bona-fide causal relationships seems to me to come down, in substantial measure, to whether the  relationships in question are more like (7.1) or more like (7.2).  
In some cases, the assumption that we are dealing with dependency relationships between mental states that exhibit some substantial degree of realization independence seems fairly plausible. For example, while the assumption (made above) that  relationship between intention and motor action is completely insensitive to the way in which the intention is realized neurally -- that is, that intention I1  always  leads to R1 regardless of how I1 is realized -- is almost certainly an idealization, it is  not implausible that this is roughly true: that most or a very substantial range of realizations of I1 lead to R1 and that the same is true for many other intentions and behaviors. If this were not so, there would be no reason to expect any coherent relationship between intentions and simple motor actions .  A similar conclusion holds for  many cases involving chains of reasoning, plans, and learning procedures: it is hard to see how we could usefully employ these at all if they did not have some substantial degree of realization dependence. As observed in Section 2, our ability to manipulate the mental state and behavior of others also suggests some degree of realization dependence for some relationships between mental states  and between mental states and behavior.  
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^1	  Purely for reasons of expository convenience, I will assume that the systems with which we are dealing in this paper are deterministic, so that there is always a determinate answer to the question of how if at all Y would change under an intervention on X. However, M may be readily extended to stochastic systems by talking about whether a  change in the probability distribution of Y would occur under an intervention X.  I don’t think that anything important will turn in what follows to this restriction to deterministic systems. 
^2	   I have glossed over a number of issues here. For a discussion of how this difference-making conception of causation can accommodate examples involving over-determination etc. see Woodward, 2003, Chapter 2. The idea that causes must be difference-makers does not by itself exclude the possibility that causes must also satisfy other conditions that can’t be captured in difference-making terms, such as those emphasized in causal process accounts. For discussion, see Woodward, 2003, Chapter 8 and pp. 36ff below. 
^3	  Another difference, discussed in more detail in MTH is that, unlike the DN model, the interventionist account does not require that a successful explanation cite laws; instead citing an appropriately invariant   relationship is enough.  
^4	  The thesis  that mental states are (or can be) multiply realized by different neural states is received wisdom in philosophy of mind and in part just for ease of exposition I will adopt this terminology in  what follows. It is  important to emphasize, however, that this thesis is unclear  in a number of crucial respects, as recent discussion (e.g., Shapiro, 2000) has emphasized. I will also add that  although it is often  claimed  that if mental states are multiply realizable, then this rules out the possibility of any theory according to which types of mental states or mental properties are identical with types of physical states or properties, this  is simply a non-sequitur.   As emphasized above,  there is nothing in the idea of multiple realizability per se that rules out the possibility that all of the different realizers share some common physical structure at an abstract level of description. For example, different realizations of the same intention may share some aggregate feature that is a function of firing rates exhibited by a group of neurons, just as the same temperature may be realized by a variety of molecular configurations, all of which possess the same average kinetic energy.  To the extent this is so, it may (depending on the details of the case) be legitimate to identify the  upper level property (intention, temperature etc.) with this abstract physical property.
^5	  In part for this reason, I don’t find it  useful to worry, as many commentators do, about  whether, within a Lewis-style semantics, the “closest”  possible world in which the target is not scarlet is one in which it is  or is not red.   First,   the claim that the non-red world is closest seems unmotivated, given Lewis’s official similarity metric. More fundamentally, even if we interpret (3.2.1)  according to this standard of closeness, it still is defective in comparison with (3.2.2) in   failing to convey the  information that the pigeon would peck if the target was non-scarlet but red. 
^6	  Stephen Yablo (1992) holds that the relationship  between mental states and their neural realizations is  just the relationship between determinables and their determinates – that is, it is just like the relationship between  red  and scarlet. Peter Menzies (this volume), following Funkhouser, 2006   rejects this claim.  My  use of Yablo’s example in 3. 2 is not meant to endorse his general claim that the relationship between the mental and the physical is the relationship between determinable and determinate. This example as well as the others above are just meant to illustrate a range of cases in which causal claims that are less specific and which omit detail are not automatically excluded by or ruled out by other more specific causal claims and to motivate the contention that same may be true of causal claims about the mental. My assumption is that there are many different kinds of  cases  in which more specific causes fail to exclude less specific causes,  some but not all of which are naturally conceptualized in terms of the relationship between determinables and determinates.  For example, the relationship between the average value of a quantity and the particular realizations of that quantity is also arguably   not the relationship between a determinable and a determinate (at least according to the Menzies/ Funkhouser account of what that relationship is).  
^7	  We should of course distinguish between  the question of whether two causal claims are inconsistent and whether thy are different—the latter requires only that they make different claims about what happens under some interventions. It is not clear, however, that (3.4) and (3.5) are different in this sense.
^8	   See Lepore and Lower, 1987. A somewhat similar argument seems to be suggested in Yablo, 1992, as Bennett (2003) notes, and it may be that Jackson and  Petit have something similar in mind when they speak of a higher level property “programming” for its realizer – if one realizer does not occur, the “program” ensures that another will. The argument may seem particularly natural within Lewis’ framework : it may seem tempting to argue that if N11 actually occurs, then among those worlds in which N11 does not occur, those in which some alternative realizer of I1 occurs are closer to the actual world then those in which the neural realizer of some different intention from I1 occurs. I take no stand on whether Lewis’ theory licenses this  sort of inference but a little thought  will show that making it leads one  into  difficulties.  
^9	   Within an interventionist framework, the above argument (and (4.1))  would only be correct if  some back up mechanism were in place that somehow ensured that if N11 is not realized, some specific alternative to N11 (like N12) that leads   to R would occur instead, and that it is not the case that  some different alternative N21 that does not lead to R would occur. In other words, it is assumed that the causal structure is like  one in which a rifleman shoots  a victim but if he hadn’t, a second, back up rifleman would have  done so. (The analogue to (4.1) would be true in such a case) But no such back-up mechanism is stipulated to be present in the original example involving (4.1). Moreover  if  such a mechanism were present, then it  would be appropriate to cite the first rifleman’s shot (and by analogy N11) as  causing R1 which is just the result proponents of this argument want to avoid.
^10	  The claim that   such a RIDR  exists  is thus  importantly different from (and stronger than) the usual claims about  “multiple realizability” in the philosophy of mind literature. Consider the gas law PV=nRT which is RIDR involving temperature, pressure and volume that holds for a ideal gas. In this case, there is a range of variation in the microstates compatible with, say, the temperature having the  value it does such that  the gas law holds for almost all of these.  Further, the variations  in question  actually do occur – indeed, they are equally likely to occur -- and the gas behaves in the same regardless of which variant is realized.  The “multiple realizability”  emphasized in the philosophy  of mind literature is different in that (i) the focus is just on logical rather than real causal possibility  (the generalizations of common sense psychology are multiply realizable because it is logically possible they might be realized in silicon or in the minds of  extra-terrestrials but of course there is no evidence that they are so realized) and (ii) often at least, there is no  serious attempt made to argue that in humans, these generalizations would continue to hold in some range of  actual or realistically possible variations in or perturbations of neural organization. In other words, it is compatible with the philosophy of mind conception of multiple realizability  that the same  psychological  generalizations might be multiply realizabile  in humans and extra-terrestrials  but highly sensitive to the precise details of realization in both – if you change or perturb the realizers even a little bit,  the generalizations will no longer hold. The  gas law is not like this.        
^11	  Very roughly, the dynamics of this  system are such that it exhibits  extremely sensitive dependence on initial conditions  – initial states of the position and momentum of the wheel that are very, very close to each other map onto to very different final positions of the ball (whether it ends up in a red or black slot)   and moreover, for an appropriately chosen partition of the phase space into small contiguous regions, the volume of the regions that are mapped into each of these outcomes is equal   or approximately so within each cell of the partition. Thus for any distribution of initial conditions that C is able to impose – any choice of Bi --   there will be a probability for red equal to one half in repeated trials.
^12	  For additional discussion of Yablo’s proportionality constraint, see Menzies (this volume). Reformulating the idea along the grounds I suggest also has the advantage that it  would not be so closely tied to the details of Yablo’s treatment of the determinable/determinate relationship.
^13	  Confusingly, because on this understanding of  casual efficacy, it is not a  (logically) stronger notion than causal relevance (when this is understood along interventionist lines) since  a condition can be causally efficacious  for an outcome without being causally relevant to it—see below.
^14	  Of course it is  also true that on this conception of causal efficacy, one doesn’t require anything like the causal exclusion argument to reach the conclusion that mental properties are not causally efficacious: this conclusion follows immediately just from the fact that mental cause claims do not cite fundamental physical forces. In other words, on this conception, the mental would be causally inefficacious even if the exclusion argument is entirely bogus.
^15	  For an influential recent statement of this sort of skepticism about the role of causal notions in physics, see Norton,  2007. Woodward, 2007 defends the view that causal notions are most at home and apply most naturally in so-called special sciences like biology and the behavioral and social sciences, as well as in common sense contexts, rather than in fundamental physics. It is also worth observing in this connection that while many philosophers seem to find “physical” accounts of causation appealing (because they are thought to capture the “umph” aspect of causation) it has proved very difficult to formulate such theories in  even a roughly  acceptable way. For example, by far the best worked out version of such a theory is the Salmon (1984)/Dowe (2000) physical process theory and this faces huge internal difficulties, has at best a  very limited range of application, and generates lots of counterintuitive consequences.—see, e.g. Woodward, 2003, Chapter 8. So while  philosophers of mind may find it natural and intuitive to suppose that there  must be a notion of cause that goes beyond mere causal relevance (understood in terms of  interventionist counterfactuals), this does not mean that we presently have a workable account of this notion.  To the extent that we don’t have such an account, this is another reason for not  regarding mental causal claims as lacking something important that is supplied by a more robust physical notion of causation.  
^16	  For additional discussion see section 6 below.  
^17	  Since Robb and Heil frame their discussion around the issue of the causal role of functional properties, let me note for the sake of completeness that there may well be special problems in combining a purely functionalist construal of the mental with the assumption that such properties are causally relevant. (This essay does not explore this question). However the claims that Robb and Heil go on to make in the quoted passage do not seem to turn on the property F’s having a distinctively functional interpretation. It is just the fact that F is realized by N that is claimed to create problems.
^18	   I say “apparent reliance” because although discussions of the exclusion problem in the philosophy of mind literature make free use of terms like “causally sufficient” and “causally relevant” these are usually illustrated by means of examples rather than explicitly defined. As a result it is not always clear what is assumed when such terms are used.     
^19	  Although this assumption seems unavoidable if we think of causation in terms of one condition being sufficient for another, note that the corresponding principle  framed in terms of causation understood along  interventionist lines is far from obvious and may well be false. That is, as the examples in Section 3 show, it is not all clear that if P causes P* and M* supervenes on P*, then P causes M*. 
^20	  For some very similar arguments about when it is reasonable to assess  whether M1 causes M2 by considering what would happen if one were to vary M1 while holding fixed certain other variables such as N1, see Shapiro and Sober, forthcoming.  The remarks that follow are  much indebted to their discussion.
^21	  I don’t intend by these remarks  to advocate an uncritical attitude toward   all the various notions of supervenience that have  figured in discussions of the relationship between the mental and the physical. In fact, I think that many of these notions are  full of obscurities. I claim only that to the extent that the mental supervenes on the physical in accord with some  well-defined  or well-behaved notion of supervenience,  the counterfactual test C  is inappropriate for assessing the causal influence of the  mental. If a candidate notion of supervenience seems to license this test as appropriate, this is a reason for being skeptical of that notion. I will add that on one interpretation of Kim’s arguments,  they are not directed so much at the clam that  mental states can be causes but are rather designed  to show that (many) proponents of supervenience and multiple realization (understood as something distinct from type identity) have failed to explain in a principled way what the rules are for combining supervenience claims and causal claims.   
^22	   Essentially the same argument is also given in Shapiro and Sober, forthcoming.
^23	  For a more detailed treatment of this sort of over-determination within an interventionist  framework, see Woodward, 2003, Chapter 2.
^24	  For a more detailed treatment of such pre-emption cases, again see  Woodward, 2003, chapter 2.
^25	  For an argument that something like this is the case for generalizations linking the behavior of psychopaths to deficits in their “fear systems” and to a general lack of fearfulness, see Blair et al. (2005).
